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Abstract: Increasingly, a small number of low-wage countries such
as China, India and Mexico are involved in incremental innovation.
That is, they are responsible for resolving production-line bugs and
suggesting product improvements. We provide evidence of this new
phenomenon and develop a model in which there is a transition from
old-style product-cycle trade to trade involving incremental innovation
in low-wage countries. The model explains why levels of involvement
in incremental innovation vary across low-wage countries and across
ﬁrms within each low-wage country. We draw out implications for
sectoral earnings, living standards, the capital account and, foremost,
international trade in goods.
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When the auto parts giant Delphi Technologies ﬁrst set up shop in Chihuahua, no one predicted
that the Mexican shop-ﬂoor engineers at this low-wage affair would soon be introducing minor
product changes that would slash product failure rates. While the cumulative effects of these
product changes are large, no single innovation is pathbreaking. Even the most sophisticated
innovations — those that actually generate patents — are just better mouse traps that increment-
ally improve on existing auto parts technology. For example, most Delphi-Chihuahua patents
improve on the control systems of minor moving parts. These patents are examples of incremental
innovation, Rosenberg’s (1982a) unsung hero of modern economic growth. This paper is about the
rise of incremental innovation in a select group of low-wage countries, how it is allowing these
countries to export increasingly sophisticated new goods, and why it is leading to a major shift in
world trade patterns.
Incremental innovation in low-wage countries is not part of the lexicon of international trade
theory. Instead, we are glued to Vernon’s (1966) product-cycle theory in which products and pro-
cesses are developed and standardized in rich countries before being moved offshore to low-wage
countries. (See also Krugman, 1979, and the more sophisticated approaches of Grossman and
Helpman, 1991b,c and Antràs, 2005.) Increasingly, though, the ﬁrst location of production for
moderately sophisticated goods is taking place in a handful of low-wage countries such as China.
As a result, the many bugs that plague new goods and their production processes must be partly
and sometimes wholly resolved by local managers and engineers. That is, for the ﬁrst time ever a
handful of low-wage countries are engaged in incremental innovation. If incremental innovation
is indeed the unsung hero of modern economic growth, then the long-term implications of this
development are enormous.
From the perspective of a rich-country ﬁrm, there are costs and beneﬁts of involving low-wage
countries in incremental innovation. One key beneﬁt is that it frees up valuable innovation
resources at home so that they can be focused on ‘big ideas’ innovation. In addition, low-wage
country involvement in incremental innovation allows the ﬁrm to locate production in a low-
wage country even before products and processes are fully developed and standardized: local
engineers are used to help complete the process of standardization. By locating a good’s ﬁrst
production line in a low-wage country, the process of lowering labour costs is telescoped forward.
Another beneﬁt is that in a world of complex foreign supply chains, a ﬁrm that involves local
suppliers in incremental innovation can insist that each supplier deliver continual product and
process upgrades. Being directly engaged in the production process, suppliers can come up with
improvements on the shop ﬂoor that would have been more costly for the ﬁrm to identify from
head ofﬁce. These additional improvements allow ﬁrms such as Delphi to stay a hair’s breadth
ahead of the competition.
Against these beneﬁts are some signiﬁcant drawbacks of involving local suppliers in incre-
mental innovation. First and foremost, parts suppliers from low-wage countries typically produce
components for complex, interdependent systems in which an incremental improvement in one
component is not effective unless other components are also modiﬁed. This interdependence
1means that parts suppliers do not internalize all of a ﬁrm’s innovation costs. In the simplest case,
when a ﬁrm asks a parts supplier to improve a component, the solution will usually entail residual
incompatibilities with other components of the system, thus forcing the ﬁrm to incur the additional
expense of bringing other components into line. Basically, the ﬁrm can always trust its low-wage
country parts supplier to screw up a little and possibly a lot.
The modelling core of this paper is about the ﬁrm’s choice of organizational form — whether
or not to involve the supplier in incremental innovation — and how this choice can be used to
manage the residual incompatibilities that come to the fore when incremental innovation occurs in
low-wage countries. We also model a second and more familiar cost of involving a local supplier in
incremental innovation. Once involved, the supplier acquires information and expertise that can
be used outside the relationship. This makes it necessary for the ﬁrm to offer expensive incentives
aimed at encouraging the supplier to stay within the relationship.
We embed this choice of organizational form into a general equilibrium model. This yields
predictions about the extent to which a low-wage country will (1) attract rich-country ﬁrms and
(2) engage in incremental innovation. We then build on these results to generate a rich set of
predictions about international trade in goods, the capital account, earnings and living standards.
Empirical Evidence
Systematic evidence on incremental innovation, especially in low-wage countries, is non-existent
(see Rosenberg, 1982b, von Hippel, 1988, and Sutton, 2001, for case-study evidence)1. Fortunately,
there are two observable activities that are tied into incremental innovation. First, incremental
innovation is most intense during the early stages of the production of new goods, when product
bugs are ﬁxed and production processes optimized. This is why learning curves are steepest by far
in the earliest stages of production (e.g., Lucas, 1993, and Nahmias, 2005). Thus, one way to track
incremental innovation is to track where new goods are produced. Second, while incremental
innovation is about minor cumulative improvements to products and processes, occasionally it
leads to patents. Thus, a second way to track incremental innovation is to track patents developed
by residents in low-wage countries for rich-country corporations.
Some evidence on the ﬁrst location of production of new goods can be culled from the business
strategies of the world’s ﬁve largest contract manufacturers (whose worldwide employment tops
halfamillionworkers). Sanmina-scireportsthat54ofits159plantsareexclusivelyengagedinpro-
ducing new goods and developing new products. The top locations for these plants are (number
of plants in parentheses): us (15); Canada (5); China, Hungary and Sweden (4); Finland, Germany
and Israel (3); and the UK and Mexico (2). What stands out from this list is the appearance of three
lower-wage countries: China, Hungary and Mexico.
1Anecdotal evidence on more substantial innovations frequently appears in the press. For example, 3com’s 8800
high-end network switch and Nokia’s 6108 handset were developed in China. Further, in 2002 China drew 3.1% of R&D
expenditures abroad by us multinationals, a huge increase relative to its 1994 share of 0.1%, and equivalent to almost
one-half of Japan’s 2002 share (unctad, 2005). However, the incremental innovations on which our paper focuses are
rarely the stuff of news reports.
2% of New Goods Imported by the United States from Each Country
By Number By Value
1990–92 2000–02 Change t 1990–92 2000–02 Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rich
Japan 68% 55% -13% (−15.51) 34% 9% -24%
Canada 46% 46% 0% (−00.31) 25% 7% -18%
Germany 62% 62% -1% (−00.86) 10% 7% -4%
Poor
China 17% 48% 30% (−35.80) 0% 5% 5%
Malaysia 9% 16% 8% (−09.25) 2% 7% 5%
Thailand 5% 11% 6% (−06.91) 1% 1% 0%
India 6% 10% 5% (−05.42) 0% 0% 0%
Mexico 19% 23% 4% (−04.57) 6% 4% -2%
Philippines 6% 9% 4% (−04.51) 1% 4% 3%
Indonesia 1% 3% 2% (−02.27) 0% 0% 0%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from us Bureau of the Census.
Notes: This table reports statistics on goods that were ﬁrst imported by the United States either in the period 1990–92
or the period 2000–02. Only new goods in medium-high-technology and high-technology sectors are included (us
National Science Board, 2006): chemicals (including pharmaceuticals), machinery (including electronics), transportation
equipment, and instruments. Column 1 states that of the innovative new goods ﬁrst imported by the United States in
1990-92, Japan was an exporter 68% of the time. Column 1 sums to more than 100% because most new goods are
imported into the United States from several countries. Column 5 states that of the innovative new goods ﬁrst imported
by the United States in 1990-92, 34% by value was imported from Japan. Column 5 would sum to 100% if all United
States trading partners were listed.
Table 1. Origin of us Imports of Innovative New Goods
For more systematic evidence showing that this Sanmina-sci example generalizes we turn
to trade data. Following Feenstra and Rose (2000), we can identify where new goods are ﬁrst
produced using us import statistics. The United States classiﬁes imports using 10-digit Harmon-
ized System (hs) codes, which currently cover over 17,000 products and are regularly updated
to incorporate new goods. A 10-digit Harmonized System (hs) good is ‘new in year t’ if it was
ﬁrst imported into the us in year t. For example, the United States ﬁrst imported hs8471923600
(“Assembled laser printer units incorporating at least the media transport, control and print
mechanisms, capable of producing more than 20 pages per minute”) in 1994, primarily from
Japan. The us ﬁrst imported hs8477104000 (“Injection-molding machines for manufacturing video
laser discs”) in 1995, with two-thirds of imports by value coming from Germany, China and the
Netherlands.
Table 1 shows that production of new goods is beginning to happen in low-wage countries. The
table reports statistics for innovative new goods, i.e. new goods in medium-high-technology and
high-technology sectors (us National Science Board, 2006): chemicals (including pharmaceuticals),
machinery (including electronics), transportation equipment, and instruments. In the 1990-92
period, the us imported 694 innovative new goods. Of these, 472 or 68% were exported by Japan
to the us (see column 1). A decade later, of the innovative new goods that ﬁrst appeared in the
2000-02 period, only 55% of these were exported by Japan to the us (see column 2). The decline
3of 13% is statistically signiﬁcant (t = −15.51). In contrast, only 17% of innovative new goods
arrived from China in 1990–92, whereas 48% arrived from China in 2000-02. This is an increase of
30% (t = 35.80). The other big gainers among poor and middle-income countries were Malaysia,
Thailand, India, Mexico and the Philippines. All other middle-income and poor countries (such as
Indonesia) never exported substantial numbers of innovative new goods. That is, the phenomenon
is conﬁned to only a handful of countries.2
Columns 5–7 of table 1 provide an alternative view of the same phenomenon. They report the
share of us imports of innovative new goods that originated in the indicated country by value
instead of by number. For example, Japan accounted for 34% of us imports of innovative new
goods in 1990–92, but only 9% in 2000–02. In contrast, China’s share rose from 0% to 5% in just
a decade. Thus, the conclusion that low-wage countries are beginning to be the ﬁrst location of
production comes from both frequency data and trade volume data. Table 1 leaves little doubt
that some low-wage countries are now the location of early stages of production and hence of
incremental innovation.
A second source of evidence on incremental innovation is suggested by our introductory ex-
ample of Delphi patents generated by Mexican engineers at Delphi’s Guadalajara facility. This
source is the us patent database (http://www.uspto.gov/). For each patent, the database lists
whether the patent is owned by a us entity (such as Michigan-based Delphi) and whether any of
the inventors reside in a low-wage country. We have computed the total number of us patents with
a us assignee and the share of these patents that list an inventor residing in China or other low-wage
countries. In the 1995–97 period, of all patents assigned to us corporations, only a minuscule 0.05%
listed an inventor residing in China. By 2003–05, China’s share had risen to 0.33%. While 0.33%
may seem small for a country as large as China, the share compares favourably to Japan’s share
of 1.1% in both 1995-97 and 2003–05. Further, the rapid increase in China’s share since 1995–97 is
suggestive of a signiﬁcant increase in incremental innovation. As with us imports of innovative
new goods, there are only a handful of low-wage countries appearing frequently in the us patent
database. These include India and Mexico.3
In summary, us import and patent data both provide consistent and systematic evidence that a
small number of low-wage countries are engaged for the ﬁrst time in the incremental innovation
associated with resolving production-line bugs and suggesting product improvements. We will
show that this has important implications for the future of world trade.
2Data on us imports at the 10-digit hs level are subject to mis-classiﬁcation by customs ofﬁcials and jobbers, which
result in minuscule amounts of exports of most goods by many countries. To eliminate such errors, a country is only
counted as having exported a new good to the us if it accounted for at least 1% of us imports of that particular new
good. Had we not done this, the statistics in table 1 would have been even more supportive of our claims.
3The numbers for India are virtually identical to those for China. This is surprising given India’s low values in table
1. The explanation is that Indian patents in pharmaceuticals oriented to tropical diseases and in business processes do
not give rise to exports of goods to the us. Mexico also experienced an increase in its patent share, which rose from
0.04% in 1995–97 to 0.09% in 2003–05. However, while China and India’s shares continue to grow rapidly, Mexico’s has
been stagnant for the last four years.
4Related literature
This paper has many touchstones with the existing international trade literature. Vernon’s (1966)
product-cycle model and its dynamic Ricardian variants (e.g., Krugman, 1979, Grossman and
Helpman, 1991b,c, and Antràs, 2005) either assume or predict that innovation occurs exclusively in
rich countries. They rule out innovation in low-wage countries. In the absence of local innovation,
technologies diffuse to low-wage countries via such channels as imported machinery, fdi, scientiﬁc
journals, technology licensing and theft (Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, Markusen, 2002). A few
papers (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991b,c) allow agents in low-wage countries to actively
invest in acquiring knowledge. However, this knowledge acquisition is just reverse engineering of
products originally developed and produced in rich countries.
Our paper also ﬁts into the literature on incomplete contracts and trade. However, in order to
focus on our novel contribution we sidestep the two most important questions addressed by the
literature. The ﬁrst is about the choice between vertical integration and outsourcing in general
equilibrium (e.g., McLaren, 2000, Grossman and Helpman, 2002, 2003, Antràs, 2003). The second
is about the choice between sourcing inputs from the North or from the South (e.g., Grossman and
Helpman, 2005). Several papers combine both questions in order to deal with the choice between
integrated home production, domestic outsourcing, fdi, and offshore outsourcing, or some subset
of these (e.g., Antràs and Helpman, 2004, Grossman and Helpman, 2004, and also Antràs, 2005,
who integrates this choice in a product-cycle model). Spencer (2005), Treﬂer (2006) and Helpman
(2006) review this literature. We do not tackle these questions, choosing instead to focus on the
conditions that promote incremental innovation in low-wage countries. Our starting point is that
a Northern ﬁrm has already decided to locate production in the South. We model the ﬁrm’s choices
about (i) which of several low-wage countries to enter and (ii) whether to involve a local agent in
incremental innovation.4 Notice that we are silent on whether we are dealing with fdi or offshore
outsourcing. What matters to us is only whether incremental innovation is being done.
Our second cost of doing incremental innovation in low-wage countries deals with the possib-
ility that a local parts supplier could take the knowledge gained from incremental innovation and
use it outside of the relationship. This means that our paper is also related to work on contract
enforcement and trade. See the seminal work of Ethier and Markusen (1996) as well as Markusen
(2002) and Nunn (2007). Weak contract enforcement is one of several possible reasons why a local
parts supplier can use proprietary knowledge outside of the relationship. Ethier and Markusen
(1996) are interested in the choice between exporting and producing abroad for goods whose
production has already been standardized. Producing abroad allows the ﬁrm to beneﬁt from lower
wages, but at a cost: it also allows the local agent to passively absorb the ﬁrm’s technology and steal
it. This is an important insight. In contrast, we are interested in active participation of local agents
in the incremental innovation of new goods.
4In an earlier draft of this paper (Puga and Treﬂer, 2005) there was a third choice, namely, whether to delegate control
of incremental innovation decisions to the local agent. This aspect of the paper built on our earlier closed-economy work
on organizational choice with incremental innovation (Puga and Treﬂer, 2002) which in turn built on Aghion and Tirole
(1997). This choice and the common elements with Puga and Treﬂer (2002) have been eliminated in the current version
of the paper in order to simplify the analysis.
5The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 analyzes the de-
cision by a single rich-country ﬁrm about whether to involve her low-wage country partner in
incremental innovation. Sections 4 and 5 embed this choice in a general equilibrium international
trade framework with multiple rich-country ﬁrms and alternative low-wage country locations.
This yields predictions about the extent to which different low wage countries will engage in
incremental innovation and attract rich-country ﬁrms, as well as predictions about international
trade in goods, the capital account, earnings and living standards. Section 6 concludes.
2. Set-up
Wehaveinmindasituationinwhichausﬁrmwithanexistingproducthasdecidedtoproduceitin
China. Changes in market conditions and available technologies force the us ﬁrm to incrementally
improve the product or its production process so that it remains viable. We refer to the American
ﬁrm as the principal, denoted by ‘she’ or a subscript p. The ﬁrm has a Chinese partner, who
we refer to as the agent, denoted by ‘he’ or a subscript a. We are not concerned here with how
the us principal came to have the asset that allows her to produce (although we will discuss free
entry in section 5) or why she has decided to produce in abroad (although in sections 4–5 we will
analyze the choice between alternative foreign countries). Nor are we concerned here with the
mode of entry into China. For our purposes the Chinese partner is the senior manager/engineer
either of an independent Chinese supplier (offshore outsourcing) or of a us-owned subsidiary
(fdi). Our analysis instead focuses on the extent to which American ﬁrms involve the managers
and engineers of Chinese plants in the innovation process. This will provide the building blocks
for our general equilibrium analysis of incremental innovation and international trade.
Incremental innovation
The American principal can develop the incremental innovation in the United States and ask the
Chinese agent merely to implement it. We call this ‘Principal Innovation’ and denote it by super-
script PI. Alternatively, the American principal can assign the role of developing the incremental
innovation to her agent in China. We call this ‘Agent Innovation’ and denote it by superscript AI.
Developing the incremental innovation requires ‘creative’ effort either from the principal under
principal innovation or from the agent under agent innovation. Let ei be the innovation effort of
i (i = p,a) where ei ∈ [0,1]. Innovation effort level ei leads to a successful incremental innovation
with probability ei and to no innovation with probability 1− ei.
Incremental innovations designed by the Chinese agent are different from those designed by the
American principal. In particular, interactions between interdependent components of a complex
system imply that an incremental innovation designed by the Chinese agent creates some residual
incompatibilities for the American principal. The principal must then exert some ‘debugging’
effort to sort out these residual incompatibilities. The importance of residual incompatibilities is
parameterized by r ∈ [0,1]. For simplicity, we assume that debugging effort by the principal is the
only characteristic distinguishing one incremental innovation from another. Every successfully
developed and debugged incremental innovation allows production of one unit of output with no
6additional inputs required other than those provided by the principal and the agent and yields the
same total proﬁt π.
Both the creative effort ei required to develop an incremental innovation and the debugging ef-
fort required to sort out residual incompatibilities r are costly because they eat into an individual’s





1− ep under principal innovation,





1 under principal innovation,
1− ea under agent innovation.
(1)
Preferences are Cobb-Douglas with equal exponents on consumption and leisure and homothetic





where yi is i’s income li is i’s leisure and P is the relevant price index.
Sequence of events
We turn now to the sequence of events. The American principal and Chinese agent randomly
match and sign a contract governing their relationship. Contracts are incomplete in the sense that
they cannot be contingent on innovation effort, on the quality of innovations, or on proﬁts. The
agent has no liquid assets so the principal cannot ask for lump-sum transfers from the agent. In
addition, at the time of signing the contract, the principal and the agent have only a rough idea
of how good the Chinese agent will be at incrementally improving the principal’s product. It is
only in the course of working together that they get a clearer sense of the residual incompatibilities
or debugging effort that the principal will bear if the agent develops the incremental innovation.
We formalize this learning process in a stylized way. When the principal and agent match they
have only a broad sense of the residual incompatibilities that an agent-developed innovation will
create for the principal. This is described by a prior cumulative distribution function F(r) over the
residual incompatibilities parameter r. After working together they learn r exactly.
By default, the principal and the agent engage in principal innovation, a product-cycle relation-
ship in which all of the technology is developed by the principal in the United States and then
transferred to China for use in production by the Chinese agent. The Chinese agent receives a
previously-agreed wage w.5 However, after they start working together and learn r, the principal
may offer to involve the agent in innovation. Local agent involvement allows the American
principal to replace her innovation effort with that of her Chinese agent.
There are, however, two disadvantages of involving the Chinese agent in innovation. First,
as discussed above, an incremental innovation developed by the Chinese agent creates residual
5The principal is protected by limited liability, so if there is no incremental innovation and thus production fails the
principal does not need to pay the agent’s wage.
7incompatibilities that the American principal has to resolve. In addition to residual incompat-
ibilities, there is a second ‘earnings premium’ disadvantage to involving the Chinese agent in
developing an incremental innovation. To be able to contribute to the incremental innovation, the
agent needs conﬁdential technical and/or marketing speciﬁcations from the American ﬁrm. Much
of this information will typically be non-codiﬁable information passed on by us managers and
engineers to their Chinese counterparts. This information will almost certainly be valuable outside
the relationship. Thus, once the Chinese agent has this information, the American principal will
have to pay an earnings premium in order to retain the Chinese agent.
Weassumethereisasurplusif, aftertheagenthasbeengivenaccesstoconﬁdentialinformation,
the principal and agent maintain their relationship. The outcome of bargaining over this surplus
can be described as an ex-post sharing rule whereby the agent gets a share λ of proﬁts and the
principal a share 1 − λ. For instance, suppose the principal and agent successfully develop an
incremental innovation. If they produce together, joint proﬁts are π. If they go their separate ways,
the principal obtains proﬁts πO
p , net of the additional costs she must incur to be able to produce
without the agent. Likewise, the agent obtains proﬁts πO
a , net of the additional costs he must incur
to be able to produce without the principal. The surplus of the relationship is π − πO
p − πO
a , which
we assume is positive. If, for example, we use the Nash bargaining solution with equal weights to









p ). In this case, under agent innovation ex-post




p )/π. If the agent is not
involved in innovation, he does not gain access to information that would allow him to produce
without the principal and is better off staying in the relationship and collecting the wage w.





w under principal innovation,
λπ under agent innovation,
yp = π − ya .
(3)
3. The choice over the agent’s involvement in innovation
The level of agent involvement in innovation will depend on the earnings premium λπ/w and on
the importance of residual incompatibilities r. This section describes exactly how.
Principal innovation
Under principal innovation, with probability ep an incremental innovation is developed by the
principal which yields incomes ya = w and yp = π − w. With probability (1 − ep) no incremental
innovation is developed and ya = yp = 0. Substituting this and (1) into (2), yields the following











8The problem for the principal is to choose ep in order to maximize EUPI
p , which yields ep = 1/2.
















Under agent innovation, substituting (1) and (3) into (2), yields the following expected utility levels










(1− ea) . (9)
The problem for the agent is to choose ea in order to maximize EUAI
a , which yields ea = 1/2.
















The principal chooses the organizational form that she prefers between principal innovation and
agent innovation.
Proposition 1 (Extent of the agent’s involvement in innovation) The principal prefers agent innovation
to principal innovation if and only if










p is given by equation (10) and EUPI
p by equation (6).
Of course, the agent will only accept to be involved in incremental innovation if EUAI
a > EUPI
a .
Lemma 1 (Agent’s participation in innovation) The agent accepts the principal’s offer of involvement in
innovation if and only if the earnings premium is high enough, λπ
w > 2.
Proof The agent accepts the principal’s offer of involvement in innovation if and only if EUAI
a >
EUPI
a , where EUAI
a is given by equation (11) and EUPI
a by equation (7).
It may be useful to the reader if we recap our partial equilibrium analysis before embedding it in
a general equilibrium international trade framework. The American principal and Chinese agent
match and have a prior F(r) about their residual incompatibilities parameter r. Initially they agree
9onacontractwhichpaystheagentawage w forstartingupaproduct-cyclerelationship. Thiswage
w will adjust to reﬂect the general equilibrium outside opportunities available to the principal and
the agent at the time of signing the contract. Once the relationship is started up both parties learn
r. When r is large, the principal remains in charge of the incremental innovation and chooses her
level of creative effort ep. If the principal is successful in developing an incremental innovation
then there is production and the agent is paid w. When instead r is small, the principal asks the
agent to become involved in innovation. If the agent accepts, he chooses his level of creative effort
ea. If the agent is successful in developing an incremental innovation then the principal must
exert debugging effort r to resolve residual incompatibilities. At that point, whatever the level of
creative effort exerted by the agent and the residual incompatibilities created by his incremental
innovation, the principal will have to pay the agent λπ instead of w in order to keep him from
running away with the knowledge acquired.
For the American principal the key advantage of involving the Chinese agent in incremental
innovation is that it allows her to replace her own innovation effort, ep = 1/2, with that of
her Chinese agent. There are, however, two disadvantages of involving the Chinese agent in
innovation. First, an incremental innovation developed by the Chinese agent creates residual
incompatibilities that the American principal has to resolve. Second, an agent involved in in-
novation must be paid an earnings premium to keep him from running away with the knowledge
acquired. Proposition 1 shows there is a threshold level of residual incompatibilities r above which
the principal does not ﬁnd it worthwhile to involve the agent in innovation. This threshold level
is a decreasing function of the earnings premium. Earlier we presented this earnings premium
from the point of view of the agent, λπ
w . However, from the principal’s perspective this is better
expressed as the ratio of the principal’s income under principal innovation to the principal’s
income under agent innovation π−w
(1−λ)π = 1−w/π
1−λ . This is the ratio that appears in the right-hand
side of equation (12).
Note that we have set up the model so that innovation effort levels are independent of ﬁrm
proﬁts π. General equilibrium feedbacks will enter only via the earnings premium and its effect
on the threshold level for the residual incompatibilities parameter r. Our parsimonious approach
is intended to highlight the key role of the earnings premium. It will also have the effect of
simplifying the analysis of general equilibrium international trade ﬂows.
4. International trade and incremental innovation
We now turn to the implications or our model for incremental innovation in low-wage countries
as well as for international trade and income disparities. So far we have focused on the decision by
a single us ﬁrm about whether to involve her Chinese partner in incremental innovation. In this
section we consider multiple us ﬁrms or principals. Different principal-agent matches will have
different values of r and hence choose different ways of organizing innovation. All that is required
for the coexistence of different organizational forms is sufﬁcient heterogeneity in the distribution of
matches i.e., in the distribution of r. This will play an important part in our discussion of why some
10countries are stuck in product-cycle trade while others have moved to incremental innovation-
based trade.6
Let M betheendogenousnumberofusﬁrms. Eachﬁrmmustchooseaproductionlocationfrom
among multiple low-wage countries. For concreteness, let each principal be a us auto designer or
manufacturer who has decided to produce auto parts (or autos for short) in a low-wage country.
Since we are not interested in the choice between producing in high-wage versus low-wage coun-
tries we assume that all auto production takes place in low-wage countries. For clarity we consider
only two low-wage countries — China and Indonesia.7 This choice of country labels reﬂects that
both China and Indonesia are low-wage countries recipients of substantial foreign investments.
However, China has become a prominent location for ﬁrst production of new innovative goods
and experienced rapid growth in innovations developed by locals for us multinationals (see the
numbers in the Introduction, particularly table 1), whereas Indonesia has not.
To bring the results into stark relief we allow for only one difference between China and
Indonesia. When a principal goes to China, she is less likely to face large residual incompatibilities.
Mathematically, let F be the cumulative distribution function of the r in China and let F∗ be the
corresponding cumulative distribution function in Indonesia. Both F and F∗ are assumed differ-
entiable. Asterisks will denote Indonesian variables throughout. We assume that F∗ ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominates F. This means that F∗ is right-shifted relative to F: F∗ 6 F for all r, with




0 u(r)dF(r) for any non-increasing function u(r).
Although we believe the assumption that F∗ ﬁrst-order stochastic dominates F to be the obvious
one, it is worth reviewing the evidence for what the Chinese distribution looks like relative to
countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. First, relative to Indonesian engineers,
Chinese engineers receive training that allows them to work more effectively with us engineers.
Part of this is the high quality of Chinese engineering schools. The Times Higher Education Supple-
ment places 2 Chinese engineering schools in the top 15 worldwide and another 6 in the top 100. In
contrast, no Indonesian, Thai or Philippine school makes this list.8 Also, there is a large number of
Chinese nationals who graduated from us engineering schools and moved back to China. Among
foreign-born scientist and engineering students who are enrolled in us schools but have no ﬁrm
plans to stay in the United States, 25% are from China whereas only 1% are from Indonesia, Thai-
land and the Philippines combined.9 The large number of Chinese with us engineering degrees
makes it easier to initiate contacts (credentialism) and communicate engineering solutions.
Second, Chinese engineers likely have better speciﬁc industrial training than their Southeast
Asian counterparts. They have been nurtured by the Chinese diaspora in Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore and the United States which has invested heavily in bringing Chinese manufacturing
6This coexistence of forms has the ﬂavour of Melitz (2003) where exporters and non-exporters coexist because of
cross-plant differences in productivity. Likewise, Antràs and Helpman (2004) use Melitz’s productivity heterogeneity
to generate the coexistence of integrated home production, domestic outsourcing, fdi and offshore outsourcing.
7As will become clear, it requires virtually no change in our analysis to allow for any ﬁnite number of low-wage
agent countries and high-wage principal countries.
8Rankings are published in Times Higher Education Supplement, 5 November 2004, available at http://www.thes.co.
uk/worldrankings/.
9Authors’ calculations based on data in Johnson (1998) and http://sestat.nsf.gov.
11plants up to snuff. Kerr (2006) shows that the large ethnic Chinese and ethnic Indian research
communities based in the United States have greatly facilitated knowledge diffusion and increased
output in innovative sectors back in China and India (Kerr, 2006, uses data on ethnic inventor
names appearing in us patents, data on foreign citations to these patents, as well as data on
migration and production patterns). There is also signiﬁcant evidence that Chinese plants are
adopting Western management techniques which emphasize quality control and information ﬂow.
This can be seen, for example, in the prevalence of iso 9001 certiﬁcates, a standard reference for
quality management practices in business-to-business dealings. As of December 2003, China had
a stock of almost 100,000 iso 9001 certiﬁcates compared to only 3,449 for Indonesia, Thailand and
the Philippines combined. Even controlling for differences in country size, this is a huge difference
in certiﬁcations.10
Third, China is a major fdi destination for us ﬁrms not just because of its low-wages, but also
becauseofthesizeofitsinternalmarket. ThismeansthatﬁrmsinChinaareproducingfordomestic
consumption, a fact that puts Chinese engineers in closer proximity to customers. For instance,
Nokia designed its 6108 handset in Beijing to optimize its Chinese text messaging capabilities. It
has since had several other handsets designed in Beijing for different markets. The size of China’s
market and the nascent sophistication of its consumers ﬂips Vernon’s (1966) argument on its head.
Proximity to discerning consumers is a key driver of Vernon’s argument for why innovation occurs
in rich countries. Now it is an argument for why incremental innovation occurs in China.
For these three reasons it is appropriate to assume that F∗ ﬁrst order stochastic dominates F.
Note that all three reasons apply almost as much to India as they do to China.
Returning to the model, each principal makes her location choice knowing the distribution of r
she will encounter in China and in Indonesia. However, it is only after she has made her location
choice and started working with a particular agent that she learns the value of r associated with
working with that agent i.e., she learns the cost of sorting out residual incompatibilities. Thus,
in deciding whether to locate in China or in Indonesia each principal takes expectations over r.
Similarly, in deciding whether to become an agent in the auto sector or to engage in an as-yet
unmodelled alternative occupation, each agent must take expectations over r.
We focus our analysis on the case in which principals’ choices of organizational forms are non-
trivial, i.e. the case in which agent innovation and principal innovation can both arise for some
values of r. By proposition 1, a principal chooses agent innovation over principal innovation if
and only if r < r. Since r ∈ [0,1], with r < 0 a principal would prefer principal innovation for all r,
while with r > 1 a principal would prefer agent innovation for all r. Thus, agent innovation and
principal innovation are both possible preferred choices for a principal for some values of r if and
only if 0 < r < 1, where r is given by proposition 1. In addition to agent innovation being the
preferred choice for principals over some range of residual incompatibilities, for agent innovation
to actually happen it must be the case that agents accept principals’ requests to become involved
in incremental innovation. By the agent’s participation in innovation condition of lemma 1, this
requires λπ
w > 2. The appendix shows that 0 < r < 1 and λπ
w > 2 are easy to simultaneously satisfy
10Data are from iso Central Secretariat (2003).















, i = p,a . (13)
The Indonesian equivalent of equation (13) replaces F with F∗.
The agents’ problem
Consider equation (13) from the perspective of a Chinese agent. Substituting in the values of EUAI
a
and EUPI
a given respectively by (11) and (7) yields expected ex ante utility for a Chinese national


















where, from proposition 1, r(w) = 1 − 1
2
1−w/π
1−λ . The Indonesian equivalent of equation (14)
replaces F with F∗ and w with w∗ to yield EUa(w∗, F∗).
In addition to producing autos, both China and Indonesia produce apparel. Apparel is pro-
duced with raw labour i.e., without innovation effort ei. Apparel production is subject to dimin-
ishing returns to labour — think of this as capturing a ﬁxed factor such as land. To avoid scale
effects associated with the ﬁxed factor we assume that China and Indonesia are the same size,
each having a workforce of size L. We denote the (endogenous) number Chinese nationals who
choose to become agents in the auto sector by m, so that L − m is employment in the Chinese
apparel sector. We choose apparel as the numéraire so that its price is unity. Let wA(L − m) be the
marginal product and wage of labour in the apparel sector when L − m workers are employed in
the apparel sector. By diminishing returns to labour w0
A < 0.
If China produces both apparel and autos then its nationals must obtain the same ex-ante expec-
ted utility whether they work in the apparel sector or are agents in the auto sector. Utility from
working in the apparel sector is wA/P. A Chinese agent is ex-ante indifferent between working in










These two equations are central to our analysis.11
11Agents who choose the auto sector and get a low draw of r are ex-post better off than workers in the apparel sector,
whereas agents who get a high draw of r are ex-post worse off than workers in the apparel sector. As in models à la
Harris and Todaro (1970), we assume that after r is realized it is not possible for workers with a bad draw to relocate to
the apparel sector. Alternatively, we could introduce the need to obtain a degree prior to working in the auto sector and
ﬁnding out the realization of r. The earnings of agents would then have to be higher in order to compensate for the cost
of an education. For a high enough cost of education, even an agent in a high-r match will be ex post better off in autos
than in apparel.
13The principals’ problem
Each American principal must employ either a Chinese or Indonesian agent to produce one unit
of autos. In choosing between locating in China and Indonesia, each principal compares ex ante
expected returns of entering each country. Given that all successfully developed and debugged
innovations yield the same total proﬁt, from the point of view of a principal there are only two
differences between China and Indonesia: (a) the distributions F and F∗ and (b) auto sector wages,
w and w∗. Substituting the values of EUAI
p and EUPI
p in equations (10) and (6), respectively, into





















Note that r enters equation (17) in two ways. From proposition 1, r determines whether each agent
is involved in innovation or not. Second, under agent innovation EUAI
p also depends on the costs
of debugging residual incompatibilities r. The principal’s corresponding return from entering
Indonesia is EUp(w∗, F∗).
If principals operate in both China and Indonesia, expected ex-ante returns must be equalized
across the two countries:
EUp(w, F) = EUp(w∗, F∗) . (18)
This equation is also central to our analysis.
A note on general equilibrium
For our main results we will not need to make any additional assumptions about preferences. Nor
will we need to specify market structure or the entry process for principals. Our main results
about the location choices of American principals, local involvement in incremental innovation,
wages and well-being can all be obtained on the basis of equations (15), (16), and (18) alone. This
is surprising because these three equations contain six endogenous variables: w, w∗, m, m∗, π, and
P. However, what matters for our results is w, w∗, and m/m∗. We do not need to worry about
P because, with free trade, it is the same internationally and cancels out of all three equations.
Under our assumption that every successfully developed and debugged incremental innovation
yields the same total proﬁt (i.e. all autos produced appear symmetrically in the integrated goods
markets), π is also common internationally and does not matter for our comparison of China and
Indonesia. Finally, we care about the distribution of principals across the two countries (m/m∗)
rather than absolute values of m and m∗. To summarize, for all of our main results, the model
can be reduced to three equations, (15), (16), and (18) three unknowns, w, w∗, and m/m∗. We will
introduce more structure on entry, market structure, and proﬁts only for some secondary results in
our penultimate section 5.
14Wages as an equilibrating mechanism
The wage w paid under principal innovation is the key equilibrating mechanism in our model. We
thereforeassumethatthereisprincipalinnovationinbothcountries. Thissimplyrequiresthatboth
countries have positive mass somewhere on the interval (r,1]. However, since r is endogenous we
exclude it from the statement of this assumption by assuming more speciﬁcally that dF(1)/dr > 0
and dF∗(1)/dr > 0 i.e., there is mass near r = 1 in both countries. Also, we need ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance to hold strictly in at least one point where it directly matters to the principal
i.e., in at least one point below r. We again exclude the endogenous r from the statement of the
assumption by assuming more speciﬁcally that dF(0)/dr > dF∗(0)/dr i.e., there is more mass
near r = 0 in China. Note that this last assumption implies that F(r) > 0 i.e., some Chinese agents
are involved in innovation.
All our results refer to diversiﬁed equilibria, that is, equilibria in which both countries produce
both goods. (See the appendix for a discussion of what is required for this to be the case.)
While Indonesian agents produce autos in equilibrium, they need not be involved in incremental
innovation. We can now state our ﬁrst result about the key equilibrating mechanism w.
Proposition 2 (Cross-country wage differences) Suppose F∗ FOSD F. Then in any diversiﬁed equilib-
rium, auto wages are higher in China than in Indonesia, w > w∗.
Proof Suppose, contrary to proposition 2, that w 6 w∗. Differentiating equation (17) yields
∂EUp(w, F)/∂w = −[1− F(r)]/4P.12 By assumption, F places positive mass in the neighbourhood







p (r) = 1
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(1−λ)π
P (1− r) for r < r,
EUPI
p (w) = 1
4
π−w
P for r > r.
(19)
(See equations 8 and 10.) Note that up(r,w) is a non-increasing function of r and is strictly





0 up(r,w∗)dF∗(s) = EUp(w∗, F∗). Strict inequality comes
from the fact that, by assumption, dF(0)/dr > dF∗(0)/dr, which means that there is a subinterval
on which both F∗ < F and up is strictly decreasing. Combining EUp(w, F) > EUp(w∗, F) with
EUp(w∗,F) > EUp(w∗, F∗) implies EUp(w, F) > EUp(w∗, F∗), a violation of equation (18). Hence
w > w∗.
The basic insight is straightforward. Consider the top panel of ﬁgure 1. It plots the expected
utility for principals facing different values of residual incompatibilities r in China (solid line)
and Indonesia (dashed line). That is, the solid line plots up(r,w), which equation (19) deﬁnes as
EUAI
p (r) to the left of r and EUPI
p (w) to the right of r. The dashed line is the corresponding curve for
Indonesia, up(r,w∗). Note that EUp(w, F) and EUp(w∗, F∗) are integrals over r of these curves. A
core feature of the principal’s problem is that her expected utility is decreasing in r under agent in-
novation. This reﬂects the fact that the principal prefers working with an agent whose involvement
12We are using the fact that r(w) is deﬁned to satisfy 1
2(1− λ)π(1−r) = 1
4(π − w). Thus, the derivative of EUp(w, F)





























Figure 1. Principals’ utility, agents’ utility and distribution of residual incompatibilities
16in innovation creates fewer residual incompatibilities. Since, as illustrated in the bottom panel of
ﬁgure 1, Indonesia’s distribution of residual incompatibilities F∗ ﬁrst order stochastic dominates
China’s F, if w = w∗ then each principal would strictly prefer China over Indonesia. To ensure
that each principal is ex-ante indifferent between locating in these two countries, lower wages are
needed in Indonesia to offset the higher expected residual incompatibilities.
The involvement of Chinese and Indonesian agents in innovation
We now show that the smaller expected residual incompatibilities created by Chinese agents
imply that a higher fraction of Chinese agents is involved in innovation. More remarkably, even
among agents who create identical residual incompatibilities, Chinese agents are more involved in
incremental innovation than their identical Indonesian counterparts.
Proposition 3 (General equilibrium involvement in innovation) Suppose F∗ FOSD F. Then in
any diversiﬁed equilibrium r(w) > r(w∗). This implies the following. (1) Chinese agents have a higher
probability of being involved in incremental innovation than Indonesian agents. (2) Consider a Chinese
match and an Indonesian match that have identical residual incompatibilities r with r(w∗) < r < r(w).
Then only the Chinese agent will be involved in incremental innovation. The Indonesian agent will not be.
Further, the Chinese agent will be paid more and have higher utility than the Indonesian agent.
Proof By equation (12), ∂r(w)/∂w > 0. By proposition 2, w > w∗, so that r(w) > r(w∗). Consider
part (1). Since r(w) > r(w∗), ﬁrst order stochastic dominance implies that F places more mass
on the interval [0,r(w)) than F∗ places on the interval [0,r(w∗)). That is, Chinese agents have a
higher probability of being involved in innovation. Consider part (2). The result that only the
Chinese agent will be involved in incremental innovation follows immediately from proposition 1
and r(w∗) < r < r(w). Regarding utility and income, agents’ voluntary participation in innovation
implies that EUAI
a (w) > EUPI
a (w) (see lemma 1). Since w > w∗, EUPI
a (w) > EUPI
a (w∗). Hence,
EUAI







a (w∗), i.e., the Chinese agent has higher utility. Consequently,
λπ > w∗, i.e., the Chinese agent is paid more.
Part (2) of proposition 3 and to some extent part (1) operate through the endogenous general
equilibrium wage differences between China and Indonesia. Agents performing basic auto tasks
are paid more in China than in Indonesia so that the additional monetary cost of including workers
in incremental innovation is lower in China (λπ − w < λπ − w∗). Thus, the maximum residual
incompatibilities under which agents are involved in incremental innovation is also higher in
China: r(w) > r(w∗). Therefore, even agents who create identical residual incompatibilities are
more involved in incremental innovation in China than in Indonesia. This is a general equilibrium
effect and it highlights that the cost of protecting intellectual property rights depends not only on
formal institutions but also on income levels. Here formal institutions are part of what determines
λ, the share of proﬁts that agents can capture by threatening to run away with the knowledge
acquired while involved in incremental innovation. We have assumed that λ is the same in
China and Indonesia. Nevertheless, the lower wage for workers performing basic auto tasks in
Indonesia means that Indonesian workers have to be paid a higher earnings premium not to try
17to appropriate the proﬁts from a successful incremental innovation. As a result, workers with a
value of r that would have seen them involved in incremental innovation in China are kept out of
the innovation process in Indonesia.
We could easily introduce institutional differences across countries by having λ differ between
China and Indonesia. In that case, a higher λ would reduce r (see equation (12)) and, through
general equilibrium interactions, also wages (by a similar argument to proposition 2) and the share
of auto ﬁrms locating in the country (by a similar argument to proposition 4 below). Thus coun-
tries with weaker protection of intellectual property (higher λ) are less involved in incremental
innovation, have lower income, and attract less foreign direct investment.
The location of American principals
ThebetterdistributionofChineseagentsmakesChinaamoreattractivelocationthanIndonesiafor
the same wages. However, wages are lower in Indonesia and this offsets China’s advantage from
the point of view of principals. We now wish to see how the trade-off between a better distribution
of agents in China and lower wages in Indonesia plays out for the relative number of principals in
each country.
In principle, to determine the relative number of principals in each country we would need
to worry about the effects of free entry. To understand why, suppose that initially China and
Indonesia are identical and that we then improve the Chinese distribution. Start by holding the
number of us principals ﬁxed. Then us principals move from Indonesia to China and w rises
relative to w∗. This raises the returns to Chinese agents in the auto sector, leading to a migration
of Chinese workers from the apparel to auto sectors. Because of diminishing returns in apparel
production, this also raises the Chinese apparel wage wA(L−m). Conversely, Indonesian workers
migrate from the auto to apparel sectors, thus depressing Indonesian apparel wages wA(L − m∗).
Now allow entry of us principals. The improvement in the Chinese distribution together with
falling wages in Indonesia make both locations more attractive to us principals. This should lead
to entry of us principals, which in turn should reduce proﬁts. The next proposition states that,
no matter what happens to proﬁts or the total number of us principals (recall that we have not
determined either of these), China must end up with more than half of all principals.
Proposition 4 (Location of American principals) Suppose F∗ FOSD F. Then in any diversiﬁed
equilibrium, more American principals locate in China than in Indonesia, m > m∗.























By assumption, F places positive mass in the neighbourhood of r = 1 so that F(r) < 1. The term
in brackets, [λπ/4P − w/2P], is EUAI
a (w) − EUPI
a (w) which is non-negative (otherwise the agent
would turn down the principal’s request to assist in innovation). Since F is a cumulative density
function, dF(r)/dr > 0. By equation (12), ∂r/∂w > 0. Hence, ∂EUa(w, F)/∂w > 0. By proposition
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(21)
Notethat, bylemma1, ua(r,w) isanon-increasingfunctionof r. Since F∗ FOSD F, thedeﬁnitionof





EUa(w∗, F∗). Combining this inequality with EUa(w, F) > EUa(w∗, F) implies EUa(w, F) >
EUa(w∗, F∗). From equations (15) and (16),
wA(L − m)
P





wA(L − m) > wA(L − m∗). (23)
By diminishing returns to labour w0
A < 0. Hence m > m∗.
Corollary 4.1 (Apparel wages and utility) Suppose F∗ FOSD F. Then in any diversiﬁed equilibrium,
wages in the apparel sector are higher in China than in Indonesia, wA(L−m) > wA(L−m∗), and expected
utility in both the apparel and auto sectors is higher in China than in Indonesia.
The basic insight works off the agent’s indifference between the apparel and auto sectors.
Consider the middle panel of ﬁgure 1, which is the agent’s counterpart to the top panel. It plots
the expected utility for agents facing different values of residual incompatibilities r in China (solid
line) and Indonesia (dashed line). That is, the solid line plots ua(r,w), which equation (21) deﬁnes
as EUAI
a to the left of r and EUPI
a (w) to the right of r. The dashed line is the corresponding curve
for Indonesia, ua(r,w∗). Note that EUa(w, F) and EUa(w∗, F∗) are integrals over r of these curves.
Since Chinese agents are paid more than Indonesian agents under principal innovation (w >
w∗), the Chinese proﬁle lies above the Indonesian proﬁle for r > r(w). Moving left of r = r(w)
the proﬁle jumps up because of the agent’s participation constraint. This raises the Chinese proﬁle
even higher above the Indonesian proﬁle in the interval r ∈ [r(w∗),r(w)]. Thus, Chinese agents
are better off than Indonesian agents both because they have a higher proﬁle and because the
Chinese distribution puts more weight on the higher outcomes to the left. In other words, Chinese
agents are better off than Indonesian agents for two reasons. First, because they are involved
in incremental innovation activities more often and these yield an earnings premium. Second,
because when they are not involved in innovation they get a higher wage than their Indonesian
counterparts. Since an agent’s returns must be equalized across the apparel and auto sectors,
Chinese apparel wages wA(L − m) must also be higher than Indonesian apparel wages wA(L −
m∗). In general equilibrium, for wages to be higher in China, there must be more agents and hence
more American principals in China than in Indonesia i.e., m > m∗. As a corollary, higher Chinese
apparel wages also imply that utility in the apparel sector is higher in China than in Indonesia i.e.,
wA(L − m)/P > wA(L − m∗)/P. Finally, since agents are indifferent between sectors, expected
utility in the auto sector must also be higher in China than in Indonesia.
Notice that a larger share of principals go to where agents are most expensive. This result never
occurs in standard product-cycle models where us principals always locate in the lowest-wage
19country. In our model us ﬁrms take into account wages and the ability of local agents to participate
in incremental innovation. In general equilibrium, there are sufﬁcient additional principals in
China relative to Indonesia to make wages differ just enough to offset China’s advantages in
incremental innovation. These advantages stem from the lower average residual incompatibilities
created by Chinese agents and also from the lower general equilibrium earnings premium Chinese
agents must be paid to prevent them from walking away. Higher wages and greater chances
of becoming involved in incremental innovation attract more Chinese nationals into the auto
sector, where they are better off than their Indonesian counterparts. Note also that the higher
income and welfare of Chinese agents are driven by more than just China’s lower average residual
incompatibilities. Open-economy general equilibrium wage adjustments are central. In fact, to use
standard international trade terminology, there is no conditional factor price equalization: agents
who create identical residual incompatibilities can end up involved in incremental innovation and
earning a premium in China but not in Indonesia.
Production patterns and trade ﬂows
We ﬁnally establish the pattern of world production and trade ﬂows. Since China has a larger
number of American investments, China has more auto production and less apparel production
than Indonesia. These production patterns together with identical homothetic preferences imply
the following result about equilibrium trade ﬂows.
Corollary 4.2 (Trade ﬂows) Suppose F∗ FOSD F. Then in any diversiﬁed equilibrium the United States
imports more autos from China than from Indonesia and imports more apparel from Indonesia than from
China. The United States ﬁnances this trade deﬁcit with a capital account surplus against both China and
Indonesia. This capital account surplus is comprised of repatriated auto proﬁts from local operations.
Several elements stand out from this analysis. First, we have not completely speciﬁed all
equilibrium trade ﬂows, only the novel parts. For this, once again, we did not need to make any
assumptions about preferences over the different goods beyond homotheticity. Nor did we need
to specify market structure or the entry process for principals. For a complete speciﬁcation of trade
ﬂows, more structure is needed. For example, suppose we assume that apparel is a homogeneous
good with a perfectly competitive market structure and that autos are differentiated goods with
a symmetric monopolistic competition market structure. Then, in addition to what is established
in corollary 4.2, China and Indonesia both export autos to each other and China is a net auto
exporter to Indonesia. Further, Indonesia exports apparel both to the United States and China.
China exports apparel to the United States only if China is sufﬁciently large relative to the United
States. In this case, China does not import apparel from Indonesia.
Second, in most international trade models the current account must be balanced. In fact,
the balanced-trade condition is usually a central modelling ingredient that forces most of the
interesting general equilibrium interactions. In contrast, in general equilibrium in our model we
have China and Indonesia running a current account surplus against the United States and have
the United States running a capital account surplus against China and Indonesia. This allows us
20to deal with a central feature of the international trading system: there is a huge one-way move-
ment of royalty and innovation-related business-service payments from developing to developed
countries.
5. From the product cycle to the rise of innovation in low-wage countries
In January 1992, China’s Deng Xiaoping visited the nascent special economic zone of Shenzhen
as part of his now famous Nanxun or Southern Tour. His purpose was revolutionary — to praise
the efﬁciency of capitalist ﬁrms operating in this and similar zones. He announced the expansion
of the export-processing zone program and the liberalization of the foreign investment regime to
allow more foreign companies to operate in China. The rest is history. The new investment regime
has led to massive entry of foreigner entrepreneurs into Chinese manufacturing. In addition, as
shown in the introduction, Chinese manufacturing facilities are increasingly moving beyond the
production of mature goods and getting more and more involved in incremental innovation. In
this section, we examine the consequences of China’s opening up to foreign investment.
Consider a world in which initially all American principals locate in Indonesia because they are
not allowed into China. Suppose now that Deng Xiaoping makes his Southern Tour and American
principals are allowed to enter China. Once China opens up, what is the equilibrium distribution
of American principals between China and Indonesia, to what extent are agents in each country
involvedininnovation, andwhataretheconsequencesofthisforincomelevelsandtradepatterns?
To determine all of this, we must ﬁnally deal with free entry of us principals. Given that we
are nearing the end of this paper, we avoid modelling details. Suppose that us nationals choose
between being principals in the auto sector and working in an alternative occupation. Rather
than fully modelling the alternative occupation and providing details about auto-sector market
structure and proﬁts, we make two assumptions that come out of most, if not all, standard models.
We assume that entry of principals into the auto sector lowers proﬁts π and increases principals’
earnings in their alternative occupation. This allows us to establish the following results about the
consequences of China’s entry.
Proposition 5 (The consequences of China’s opening up) Suppose F∗ FOSD F. Further assume
that entry of principals lowers π and raises principals’ earnings in their alternative occupation. Suppose
that, starting from an initial situation where all American principals locate in Indonesia because they
are not allowed into China, China opens up to American ﬁrms. Once American principals are allowed
to enter China, in any diversiﬁed equilibrium, Indonesia ends up with fewer American principals and
lower wages in both sectors than before China’s opening up to American ﬁrms. China ends up with more
principals than Indonesia and with higher wages in both sectors. Chinese agents are involved in incremental
innovation more often than their Indonesian counterparts. Even agents creating residual incompatibilities
r ∈ (r(w∗),r(w)) are involved in innovation in China but not in Indonesia.
Proof Initially, Indonesia hosts all principals. After China’s opening to American principals, by
proposition 4, Indonesia hosts less than one half of all principals. If the total number of principals
has not increased, Indonesia must have fewer principals than before. We next show that the
same result holds even if the total number of principals increases following China’s opening. By
21assumption, entry of principals increases their earnings in the alternative occupation. To rees-
tablish indifference of us nationals between becoming principals and engaging in an alternative
occupation, EUp(w∗, F∗) must be higher than before China’s opening. By assumption, entry of
principals lowers auto sector proﬁts π. By equation (17), this tends to reduce EUp(w∗, F∗). Thus,
the only way for EUp(w∗, F∗) to end up being higher than before China’s opening is by having auto
wages in Indonesia w∗ fall (recall that EUp(w∗, F∗) is decreasing in w∗). Recall that EUp(w∗, F∗) is
increasing in w∗, so the reduction of auto wages in Indonesia makes Indonesian agents worse off.
By equation (14) so does the fall in proﬁts. Thus, to keep Indonesian nationals indifferent between
being agents in the auto sector and working in their alternative occupation in the apparel sector,
Indonesian apparel wages wA(L − m∗) must also fall. Since w0
A < 0, this implies that the number
of principals operating in Indonesia m∗ is lower after than before China’s opening. The higher
Chinese wages and the greater Chinese involvement in innovation follow from propositions 2
and 3.
Prior to China’s entry, the world looks close to a product cycle model: most innovation is
done in the United States and the production of the standardized good is done in Indonesia.
After China’s opening up to American investments, most American ﬁrms locating in Indonesia
and some of those locating in China continue this product-cycle pattern of developed-country
innovation followed by low-wage standardized production. However, many American ﬁrms
begin involving their Chinese agents in incremental innovation. These were precisely the patterns
implied by our numbers on ﬁrst locations of innovative new products and on patents in the
introduction.
The appearance of China on the world scene has a negative impact on investment in Indonesia.
NoticethatthepropositiondoesnotstatethatChina’sentryintoworldmarketsreducesIndonesian
welfare. We have not tracked any of the traditional gains from trade so it is still possible that
Indonesia beneﬁts from China’s entry. Our main point is simply that these traditional gains
from trade for Indonesia will be offset, at least in part, by the departure of American principals
from Indonesia. This problem has been commented on by many in the press who point out that
many ﬁrms are moving operations to China from other low-wage countries such as Indonesia and
Mexico (note Mexico’s declining share of exports of innovative new goods by value to the United
States in table 1).
6. Conclusions
Toourmind, acentralfeaturebehindtherecentsuccessofChinaandIndiaininternationalmarkets
has been the ability of these countries to deliver shop-ﬂoor incremental innovation to foreign
buyers operating complex supply chains. Firms in rich countries need their suppliers to produce
high-quality goods — goods that are reliable, have low failure rates and incorporate the latest
demands of an ever-changing marketplace.
In the old product-cycle view, all innovation, including incremental innovation, is done in the
North. The Northern-designed factory is shipped to the South without any ensuing technical
problems. However, the claim that all innovation is done in the North is no longer tenable. We
22provided the ﬁrst systematic evidence on incremental innovation in low-wage countries using
data on the location of ﬁrst production for innovative new goods and data on patents developed
by low-wage country inventors for us corporations.
In our view, and that of Sutton (2001), countries have a capacity to deliver a quality level. If this
capacity is above a certain threshold then the country becomes a player in international trade. In
our model this threshold is the level of residual incompatibilities r that demarcated matches that
involve local agents in innovation from those that do not. This resulted in a model in which the
heterogeneity of matches induced a heterogeneity of incremental innovation across countries and
even within countries.
Differences across countries are due to differences in the distribution of residual incompatibil-
ities i.e., due to differences between F and F∗. Improvements in information and communication
technologies will allow principals to better communicate with agents and reduce residual incom-
patibilities everywhere. Thus, we expect to se a trend where product-cycle trade is replaced to
some extent by trade in which agents are involved in incremental innovation and new products
are ﬁrst produced in low-wage countries. However, some countries such as China and India have
developed world-class engineering schools, send more students for training to the United States,
have a more committed diaspora, emphasize standards and quality control, or get a head-start in
working with foreign multinationals by developing products catered to a particularly large local
market. All of these developments shift the distribution of matches in these countries towards
lower values of residual incompatibilities much faster, and serve to simultaneously attract more
foreign ﬁrms and to increase the proportion of those ﬁrms that involve locals in innovation relative
to other low-wage countries. As a result, the liberalizing of the international trade regime in China
and India has led to a vast inﬂow of foreign investments into these countries. This has led to
the growth of increasingly sophisticated, high-quality Chinese and Indian exports. It has also led
to problems for countries such as Indonesia and Mexico that were once the major recipients of
Western fdi.
The rise of incremental innovation in some low-wage countries is today a central fact. This
paper is the ﬁrst to explain its implications for international trade. As we have shown, the
implications are huge — it’s time to wake up and smell the ginseng.
Appendix
Parameter restrictions
Our analysis has focused on the richest possible case in which agent innovation and principal
innovation can both arise for some values of r, agents willingly participate in innovation when
asked, and production remains diversiﬁed in both China and Indonesia. This appendix discusses
what is required to ensure this. By proposition 1, a principal chooses agent innovation over
principal innovation if and only if r < r. Since r ∈ [0,1], with r < 0 a principal would prefer
principal innovation for all r, while with r > 1 a principal would prefer agent innovation for
all r. Thus, agent innovation and principal innovation are both possible preferred choices for a
principal for some values of r if and only if 0 < r < 1, where r is given by proposition 1. This
23requires 0 < 1 − 1
2
1−w/π
1−λ < 1. As shown in lemma 1, agents always accept this choice if and only
if λπ
w > 2. These two conditions put together reduce to 1−2λ < w
π 6 λ
2. For this to be satisﬁed, we
must have 1 − 2λ < λ
2, which simply requires λ < 2
5. In addition, we need w
π to fall somewhere in
the interval (1− 2λ, λ
2]. From equations (15) and (16), we know that the agent’s wage w is directly
related to the wage in the alternative apparel sector wA. Thus, by changing the endowment of
(apparel-sector) land we can always shift wA so that w
π lies in the required interval. Finally, we have
also focused on situations in which both China and Indonesia keep some production in the auto
and the apparel sectors. This is akin to the usual restriction in trade models of being inside the cone
of diversiﬁcation. In our case, it simply requires a sufﬁciently high elasticity of the apparel-sector
wage with respect to employment.
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